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Asia's Roadmap – Forging Regional Cohesion for Global Advancement

Mr Yoshiro Kuwata, Excellencies, Hitachi Young Leaders, ladies & gentlemen: It is a great honour and pleasure for me to be here to participate in this 5th Hitachi Young Leaders Conference, which has as its theme for discussion, “ Asia's Roadmap- Forging Regional Cohesion for Global Advancement” . I would like to thank Hitachi for inviting me. And I would also like to congratulate them for their success, both past and present, in bringing together some of the best and brightest of Asia's younger generations and giving them an opportunity to meet one another and to enhance their knowledge and understanding of the world they live in.

The subject of the conference, which is also the subject I have been asked to speak on, is a very broad one. Here, I can only give some of the most salient points related to it. Needless to say, my comments are entirely my own and do not reflect the positions and policies of the last Royal Thai government or the Democratic Party.

I. The End of the Cold War

Speaking in the House of Commons a few years after the end of the Second World War, one of the United Kingdom’ s greatest statesman, Winston Churchill, said, and I quote:

"Man in this moment of history has emerged in greater supremacy over the forces of nature than has ever been dreamed of before. He has in his power to solve quite easily the problems of material existence. He has conquered the wild beasts, and he has even conquered the insects and the microbes. There lies before him, as he wishes, a golden age of peace and progress. All is in his hands. He has only to conquer his last and worst enemy-himself."

Over half a century later, it is evident that Man has yet to vanquish his worst enemy. The Cold War subjected the human race to four decades of fear and insecurity, with the world at times standing on the brink of global nuclear conflagration. Before the twentieth century’ s end, the Cold War was no more, and the possibility of a nuclear holocaust correspondingly reduced. The world breathed more easily. Many of its citizens could

afford to enjoy in relative peace and calm new lifestyles based upon rapid and far-reaching scientific and technological changes, especially in the fields of telecommunication and information.

But this sea change in global geo-strategic, social and techno-cultural environment cannot hide Man's failure to bring about what Churchill called “ a golden age of peace and prosperity” . Poverty, human degradation, conflicts and wars still abound. While many millions indulge in email, e-commerce and e-entertainment, many millions more still languish in a Hobbesian state of nature, where lives indeed can be “ nasty, brutish and short” .

II. Global Challenges

At the dawn of the 21st century, a number of global challenges remain to be effectively addressed by the world's leadership.

The first set of challenges concern old security problems.

These are problems inherited from the days of the Cold War, which have refused to go away and in some have even increased in scope and severity. They include: regional conflicts, which have the potential to escalate and bring about external powers involvement; disputes over territories or land and maritime boundaries; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; transfers of increasingly sophisticated conventional weapons and military technologies to developing countries; and international terrorism.

Terrorism is not new. At the risk of antagonising my American friends here, I would like to say that if terrorism were to be defined as “ pre-meditated violence against civilian targets for political purposes, which usually includes influence over a wider audience than directly targeted by such violence,” then terrorism is very old.

It has been practiced by both ancient states (Alexandra the Great's sack of Persepolis) and contemporary nations (the U.S. dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki). It has been used by both sub-state groups in the West (the IRA, the “ Oklahoma Bombers”) and non-Western movements (the Zionists against British rule before independence of Israel, the PLO).

But since the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon Building, a series of incidents collectively called the 9/11 incident, the problem of international terrorism gained far greater saliency as a global security issue than ever before.

It exposed in a most brutal and graphic manner possible, Modern, open societies' extreme vulnerability to pre-meditated acts of terror in a world of vastly expanded and still expanding transnational transportation, communication, telecommunication and information networks and linkages. It also provoked inevitably, and quite understandably, a very strong countervailing response from the U.S.

The first phase of the American-led crusade against international terrorism, involving military operations in Afghanistan, caused only limited political, diplomatic and security repercussions. But the roots of International terrorism have not been destroyed, the crusade will go on and there is no guaranteeing the next phase, say an attack on Iraq will be similarly limited in consequences.

The second set of global challenges consists of the so-called non-traditional security problems.

With the ending of the Cold War came a shift, in the so-called security paradigm. Traditional concerns with the security of the state as well as the geo-strategic & military dimensions of that threat, of course, remain. But there is an emerging international consensus in a number of areas.

One is that, with rapid and far-reaching scientific and technological developments, threats to the states may be mainly non-military in nature, especially where the security of the economy is concerned.

Another is that state security should not be the only point of focus. Greater attention should be paid to other aspects of security, particularly those relating to the safety and well being of human beings as individuals and groups of individuals. Non-traditional security problems include: abuses of human rights and human dignity; mass immigration; human trafficking; transmission of diseases, particularly HIV/Aids; land mines; environment degradation, natural disasters and depletion of key natural resources; drug trafficking; and money laundering, smuggling of small arms and various other types of transnational crimes, including cyber crimes.

The third set of challenges is related to the problem of development.

Today, the aggregate wealth of nations is at the highest level in history. With rapid and far-reaching scientific and technological developments, Man's present capacity to assert mastery over his natural environment, both on this planet and beyond, is also unprecedented.

But an asymmetry between capacity and will still exist.

Grinding poverty remains. The distribution of wealth and income both among and within nations is less equitable than ever. Insufficient investment is made to develop and protect Man's greatest asset- his own innate ability to learn, to work, to produce and be creative.

The so-called “ successful economic performances” often leave in their wake vastly depleted natural resources and uprooted, restless populations, with high expectations and low levels of achievement and satisfaction.

The challenge is how to bring about a more equitable and a more socially and environmentally sustainable processes of development, where process is measured, not necessarily in terms of economic growth but more in terms of opportunities for human advancement and fulfillment, the security of livelihood and quality of life.

Related to the question of development is the issue of managing global interdependence. The process of globalisation is inexorable. Through vastly increased trade, investment, business opportunities, and transfers of information, knowledge and technology, the process of globalisation can bring immense benefit, especially to countries with small populations or limited natural resources bases, like Singapore. It can also inflict terrible costs, particularly on structurally weak economies, which are vulnerable to fluctuations in global markets, and on developing societies whose traditional institutions, cultures and ways of lives are uprooted by rapid change.

The challenge, I believe, is not how to isolate oneself from this globalisation process for no one can remain immune from this process forever. Rather, the challenge is one of management. How can one manage the process in such ways as to maximise its benefits and minimise its costs to individual societies? How can one manage the

process in such ways as to ensure more equitable distribution of wealth and income both among and within nations, and how can one manage the process to bring about socially and environmentally sustainable development for the less developed members of the international community?

The fourth set of challenges is related to societal change.

Unprecedented processes of economic expansion and integration of global systems, especially in the last two decades have transformed, and are still transforming non-Western societies. Most of them are becoming more pluralistic. Also, as a result of the process of growth and integration, these non-Western societies' educational systems have been and continue to be expanded, and access to domestic and transnational sources of ideas and information enhanced both in terms of quantity and quality.

These changes in turn serve to raise the levels of social and political awareness. Expectations and demands multiply, and with them the agenda of politics and governance. Often, sooner or later, political rights and civil liberties, individual freedom and community interests, participation and accountability of governance become and are articulated as issues of concern. The questions are whether, how and how far such expectations and demands are or can be met, and what domestic, regional and international consequences there would be if they are or are not met.

The challenge of societal change is and will remain primarily directed at individual governments. Nevertheless, the challenge of societal change is also global in nature and scope.

Increasing transnational flow of ideas and information means increasing transmission of values, beliefs, expectations and demands across geographical and political boundaries. What is seen as ' progress' in one society can inspire members of another towards similar achievement. The fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the break-up of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s, together with the profound impact they had and still have on Europe and the world, bore testimony to the power for this transmission process. The troubled experiences of these countries after the collapse of communism, particularly the former Yugoslavia, also bore testimony to the enormous difficulty in addressing the challenge of societal change.

The fifth set of challenges consists of ethnic and religious conflicts.

The death of the Cold War did not bring about the birth of a global order. In the aftermath of the Cold War, there emerged a rising tide of ethnic and religious conflicts in different parts of the world, from Europe and the Middle East to Asia and Africa. Generated partly by age-old values, beliefs, mindsets and prejudices and partly by a sense of social and economic deprivation, many of these conflicts escalated into acts of violence, terrorism, civil wars and international crises. These in turn created vicious cycles of hatred, vengeance, violence and insecurities. Kosovo was an extreme case, but not the only instance demonstrating the escalatory potential and durability of such conflicts.

Ethnic and religious fault lines can be found within both Western and non-Western societies. One example is Northern Ireland and another is Kashmir. But the fault lines that seem to receive the most attention are those between the West and rest. It would take many thousands of pages to explain why this is so, but one cause was perhaps the West's post-Cold War behaviour.

Flushed with euphoria over its victory against communism, the West seemed to perceive as its mandate the task of making the world safe for democracy, human rights, economic liberalisation and international rule of law. The 1991 Persian Gulf War and NATO's intervention in Kosovo demonstrated that the West was prepared to use force in pursuit of this *mission civilatrice*. This, of course, did not go down well with many non-Western societies, which saw such universalism as a mere cloak for self-interest and felt threatened by it.

The 9/11 incident, I believe has deepened these fault lines. The outburst of moral outrage in the U.S. and elsewhere in the West was perfectly understandable. So were the U.S. diplomatic crusade and the use of military force against perceived threats to her and the international community's security. For the acts of terrorism committed on September 11th were truly terrible crimes against humanity and posed a threat to open societies in all corners of the world.

But less understandable is the American belief that the world consists of those who are for and those are against the U.S. in her war against international terrorism.

And outright dangerous is the notion that in the pursuit of this war the end justifies the means. The U.S. has the right to use military force in any way and in any place she sees fit, and torture, summary arrests, military tribunals and occurrences of “ collateral damage” are perfectly acceptable simply because the cause of the American is “ just” . These beliefs can further antagonise a number of non-Western societies, especially those with majority or sizeable Muslim populations.

The problem, of course, is rendered more complicated and dangerous by certain perceptions. Evident in many corners of the West, the typical terrorist is a bearded, sinister-looking, AK-47-wielding, Muslim Arab. The existence of ethnic and religious fault lines does not mean that conflict and war will always be inevitable, but it does pose a challenge to the maintenance of global peace and progress.

It may not be a time bomb but it is certainly a gun powder keg, which can be ignited by misplaced moral convictions, uncontrolled emotions, wrong policy decisions or ill-judged use of military force especially on the part of a major power.

III. Regional Imperatives

Pacific Asia is one of the most strategically important regions in the world.

Stretching from the Asian parts of Russia in the north to Indonesia in the south, it sits astride key lines of communication and transportation between the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean.

It is home to some 2 billion people, and nineteen states and territories, including countries with the largest population, China, and with the largest Muslim population, Indonesia. It has two confirmed nuclear powers, Russia and China, and at least another suspected of being one, North Korea. It has a large and diversified natural resource base. It leads the world in economic growth and has the world's fastest growing economy, China's. It is next door to the world' s second most populous state, India, which is also a nuclear power, and closely linked in ties of trade and investments with the largest economy - the U.S., and with the world's largest free trade agreement, the North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA).

What happens in or to the region can have global repercussions. The 1997-98 financial crisis demonstrated this very clearly.

At the dawn of the 21st century, Pacific Asia is generally at peace. Its collective economy is growing faster than other regions. Except in only a few countries, signs of prosperity and wealth are not difficult to detect. Material progress is likely to continue as China becomes a fully integrated member of the WTO.

Nevertheless, problems still abound. All the global challenges mentioned above are relevant to Pacific Asia.

Where old security problems are concerned, Pacific Asia has inherited from the days of the Cold War two potentially very dangerous regional conflicts, which are likely to involve external powers, particularly the U.S., should the situation deteriorate. One is the Korean Peninsula and the other is Taiwan.

South Asia of course is not part of Pacific Asia, but an escalation of the conflict between India and Pakistan, states with nuclear weapons without long years of nuclear responsibility, cannot but deeply affect the region's peace and security.

In Pacific Asia, disputes over territories and land and maritime boundaries still abound. Regional states continue to enhance the capabilities of their armed forces, particularly through the procurement of increasingly modern weapons systems. Most notable, perhaps, is the case of Myanmar or Burma. Despite being one of the poorest countries in the world, Myanmar has the fourth largest standing armed forces in the region, after China, South Korea and North Korea. Since 1998, Myanmar has spent an estimated US\$3 billion on arms purchases, including the recent acquisition of Mig-29s from Russia.

Nor is Pacific Asia immune to the problems of international terrorism. The threat of radical Islam should not be exaggerated and it must be stressed very clearly that most of the region's Muslim population are peaceful and wish to live in peace. But the fact is the region is home to a number of terrorist groups, consisting mostly of Muslims.

Pacific Asia also has its share of non-traditional security problems. The region has in its midst a number of regimes whose priorities do not include the protection of human rights.

Mass migration is a major problem. Trade in women and children is still on the increase, and so is the production and distribution of drugs, with China and South East Asia having become major consumers of narcotics. Although a number of countries are reluctant to admit it, HIV/Aids is a major problem as well.

Millions of land mines still lie undetected underground, ready to maim or kill innocent victims at all times.

Smuggling is extensive, including the sales of small arms to various dissident and separatist groups.

Like other parts of Asia, the region is undergoing very rapid deterioration of land and water resources. Vulnerability to natural disasters such as typhoons and floods is constantly witnessed.

And, as a price of technological progress, a number of transnational crimes are on the rise, most notably money laundering and cyber crimes. With e-commerce expected to grow at an exponentially fast rate in the next few years, this upward trend seems irreversible at the present.

Where the challenge of development is concerned, despite unprecedented accumulation of wealth and impressive achievement of scientific and technological progress, the problems remain immense.

Out of the nineteen states and territories in Pacific Asia, seven are some of the poorest nations in the world. Income distribution within most countries is becoming more unequal.

As the 1997-98 crisis demonstrated, many of the seemingly strong economies are structurally weak and are vulnerable to fluctuations in and manipulations of external markets. The pace of reform is at best uneven, and corruption, vested interests and the lack of transparency still plague macro-economic and corporate governance.

There continue to be rapid environmental deterioration and depletion of natural resources.

Despite relatively high rates of adult literacy, the general quality of education has not significantly improved, and investment in human resource development remains far from adequate.

Rural people still flock to cities, with the rate of urban growth as high as 6 to 8 per cent in many countries.

The juxtaposition of high expectations and low satisfaction often means discontentment. Discontentment is often expressed against targets such as globalisation, cultural imperialism and Westerners, as evident even in the case of post-crisis Thailand, a country that normally does not have hang-ups about things foreign.

The challenge of societal changes has been with Pacific Asia for some time.

Street demonstrations in Bangkok in the 1970s, People Power at EDSA in Manila and protests in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in the 1980s, and yet more street demonstrations in Bangkok and Jakarta in the 1990s, demonstrate the kind of expectations and demands, the kind of political pressure and violence, that can arise from rapid social and economic changes.

As one looks forward to the future, one can perhaps expect the challenge of societal change to become more salient in a number of countries, which at present are undertaking experiments in democratisation or have less-than-democratic forms of governance. What happens in Indonesia, China and Myanmar are likely to have significant impact on the region's peace and progress.

Pacific Asia is a region of great diversity. Home to many races and ethnic groups. The region is a point of convergence for three of history's greatest civilisations, Chinese, Indian and European, and four of the world's great belief systems, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam and communism.

There have been long periods of peace. Therefore, clashes of civilisation and belief systems are not inevitable. But it is also true the region's fault lines have provided conditions for long-standing violent conflicts in a number of countries, particularly Myanmar, Indonesia and the Philippines. Worsening situations in these countries are likely to have regional and international consequences.

Indeed, if Indonesia should break up because of separatism, the geopolitical landscape of South East Asia will be totally transformed, and not necessarily for the better.

During the height of the Cold War, an academic Herman Khan, talked about 'thinking about the unthinkable', meaning the nuclear war. In the case of Indonesia, let us not think about the unthinkable.

As the U.S. moves ahead with her crusade against international terrorism, one key question is what impact this crusade will have on Pacific Asia's existing ethnic and religious tensions and conflicts.

Up to this point, reactions among the region's Muslim communities against the US policy have been rather muted. But should the U.S. choose to direct her military might against further targets, perhaps Iraq, without a good reason, the reactions may not be so low-key this time.

The task of addressing a number of foregoing challenges is primarily the responsibility of individual states in the region. This is particularly true in cases requiring domestic policy and institutional reforms. Moreover, the conduct of bilateral relations between individual Pacific Asian countries and key partners outside the region must go on.

But because the challenges are largely international, transnational or regional in nature, they cannot be effectively addressed through only unilateral and bilateral actions and measures.

Multilateral, multi-dimensional cooperation among the countries in the region is needed. Where inter-governmental cooperation is concerned, regional states should work together at three levels.

The first level is global organisations, particularly the UN system, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). No matter what shortcomings they may have, these are the most important international regimes and key sources of international legitimacy, and have at their disposal many instruments and resources, ranging from economic and financial to manpower and information, which can assist the region in addressing many of its problems.

Regional collaboration should focus on efforts to make these institutions more responsive to the needs of developing countries, especially, where free and fair trade is concerned.

The second level is regional groupings. Since the last days of the Cold War, a number of regional cooperative arrangements have emerged or have become stronger. Many of these have overlapping memberships. The pace of their progress and achievement is clearly uneven. But networking constitutes an important aspect of promoting and protecting one's interest in today's world. Pacific Asian regional cooperation should focus on efforts to promote collaboration with some of these groupings, with emphasis on measures to facilitate trade, investment, transfer of technology and information and to promote infrastructural and human resource development.

The third level is cooperation among Pacific Asian states themselves. On such an occasion as this, it is not possible to sketch a detailed roadmap for cooperation at this level. Let me simply say that, in my opinion, we should follow two guidelines.

One is that priority should be placed on existing frameworks. Initiating new ideas is always attractive. But diplomacy is a time-consuming process. Modern foreign ministers are already overburdened with tight schedules and extensive travel arrangements. To add more meetings to their agenda may not work. It may even be counter-productive if individual ministers concerned are less than enthusiastic about these initiatives.

More importantly, the diplomacy of cooperation is a process. Frameworks of collaboration, which have been in place for a period of time, often have their own traditions, *esprit de corps*, auras of achievement, *modus operandi*, rhythms and procedures. These are assets that can only be acquired over time and they provide the kind of conditions necessary for success.

Thus, Pacific Asian states should concentrate on existing frameworks and build upon them. The range of activities arranged around the members of the ASEAN countries collectively or individually already provides a fair scope for addressing the region's problems on the region-wide basis.

These include the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMCs), the Asean Regional Forums (ARF), and ASEAN+3 (meaning ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea). The possibility of developing a free trade arrangement in the framework of ASEAN+3 should be considered. But otherwise, new frameworks and mechanisms should be established only to deal with specific issue-areas of critical importance, such as finance, investment, human resource development, mass migration, drug and human trafficking and environmental protection.

If there can be a broad consensus on it, human rights should also be added to the list. Perhaps in this case one should think about the unthinkable.

The other guideline is that regional states should focus their efforts on achieving five broad objectives as follows:

The first is what I call *Situation Assessment*.

As has often been said, recognition of a problem's existence is the most important step towards the problem's solution. To make cooperation among the Pacific Asia states as comprehensive and effective as possible, regional states must develop some sort of consensus regarding the prevailing realities, the nature and severity of the challenges they face, and the scope and limitations of the resources they have for addressing their challenges.

The second is what I call *Priority Setting*.

Where the problems are great and the resources are small, prioritisation is a must. Here, regional states must also develop some common perspectives regarding what should be the most important areas of regional cooperation.

The third is what I call *Asset Mobilisation*.

Because the problems are great and the resources are small, regional states must seek to mobilise as many assets as possible in the pursuit of their tasks. One way of mobilisation is to work with global institutions and regional groupings as mentioned before. Another is to pool some of their own resources to address some of the challenges in specific-issue areas, for example, joint operations against terrorism, joint

sea patrols, disaster relief operations, and the sharing of information on drug trafficking, human trafficking, HIV/Aids, money laundering and cyber crimes.

The fourth is what I call *Liability Reduction*.

Because the problems are great and the resources small, there is little room for debilitating liabilities. These liabilities must be reduced.

There are a number of different types of liabilities. Some are economic. Some are physical, for example, geographical barriers to trade and communications. Some are legal and bureaucratic. And some are human. Large reservoirs of uneducated, untrained and unemployed manpower are extremely wasteful, not only in terms of social safety net costs and opportunity costs, but also in terms of loss in human dignity and human security.

Where liabilities are concerned, perhaps the most interesting case is political liabilities. What should be done to countries whose behaviour is either threat to neighbors, an impediment to regional cooperation, an obstacle to collaboration with extra-regional factors or a combination of all these?

Obviously, one would wish cooperation among regional states to be as comprehensive as possible. This means earnest efforts must be made to forge ties that bind with 'difficult' states. But should it be impossible to bring about constructive relations with such different states, how far and how long should one be patient?

And if anyone should ask what I have in mind I will refuse to answer. I believe the answer is obvious. Perhaps here one should yet again think about the unthinkable.

And the last objective is *Conflict Management and Bridge Building*.

Pacific Asia is faced with many problems and conflicts. Ways and means must be found to manage and reduce these conflicts in a systematic manner.

ASEAN has had success as an informal framework for conflict management and reduction among members, and it must be encouraged to have a more formal role in

this area, especially in cases where domestic problems in one member country have direct consequences for the security and well-being of another.

No one wishes to do away with the principle of non-interference. It is the cornerstone of both ASEAN and the contemporary international system. But blind adherence to the principle is unrealistic in a world where domestic problems often have international, transnational or regional repercussions. Myanmar's internal predicament and its impact upon Thailand are a case in point. More flexibility is needed in the application of the principle, and this was the rationale underlying Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs Surin Pitsuwan's "Flexible Engagement" proposal to ASEAN in 1998. Similarly, the ARF has been a fair success as a region-wide framework for security dialogues. The time has come to develop it one step further and transform it into an instrument of preventive diplomacy.

Political and diplomatic institutions have important functions to perform in managing and reducing conflicts. But in the longer term, the best way to promote cooperative peace is to eliminate some of the fundamental conditions for conflict. This will take time. There is no quick fix. There is no panacea. Such efforts must start with education.

Distortions of history will hardly encourage younger generations to love their neighbours. Common values regarding order, peace, development and regional cooperation must be forged from an early age. Among youths and adults, more academic, cultural and people-to-people exchanges should be promoted. Region-wide programs, for example, a Pacific Asian version of the American Peace Corp, should be established to give opportunities for the young to get to know one another across geographical, political, religious and ideological divides.

This brings me to the last point I want to make.

Governments must take the lead in promoting cooperation among regional states. But government efforts cannot fully bear fruit unless and until civil society can be recruited to contribute to the task. For governmental resources are not limitless, and if collaboration were to be confined to interactions among political leaders and bureaucrats, regionalism will be only skin-deep.

Academia must be “ co-opted” . It can play an invaluable part in policy planning and assessment, in drafting and implementing “ regionalism-friendly” educational programmes, in promoting various types of exchanges among regional states and in influencing the public at large. So too must other opinion leaders. These include writers, artists, the mass media and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

And last but not least, the private sector must also be involved. The private sector has at its disposal immense resources, which can back governments’ efforts to promote regional development and cooperation. The private sector’s collective potential contributions go beyond the volume of trade, which it can generate, or the amount of money it can mobilise for investment. With its collective knowledge, experiences, *savoir faire* and familiarity with various types of technology including IT, the private sector can also perform as advisor to governments, educator and trainer for youth and labour, and opinion leader for the public at large.

The precondition of such involvement is, of course, recognition of corporate social responsibility. The key question is how to promote a sense of altruism or sacrifice among those whose day-to-day responsibility lies with profit margins and market shares, and not abstractions like social conscience and altruism.

The road towards peace and progress in Pacific Asia will be long and difficult. Along the way, there will be failures, setbacks and mistakes. Patience, resilience and the ability to learn from experiences will be essential qualities in the days, months and years ahead. Perhaps in the face of these challenges, we could take comfort in the words of the great Mahatma Gandhi. He once said and I quote:

‘All progress is gained through mistakes and their ratification. No good comes fully fashioned out of God’s hands, but has to be carved out through repeated experiments and repeated failures by ourselves. This is the law of individual growth. The same law controls social and political evolution also. The right to err is the universal condition of all progress.’

Thank you very much.